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Description
Describe the bug
Since wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1 (archive.raspberrypi.com, trixie, 2026-09-17) a Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W loses Wi-Fi permanently on a WPA2/WPA3 transition-mode access point. The link drops at the moment the package upgrade restarts wpa_supplicant.service and does not come back after a reboot. On a headless box this is a full loss of access.
Mechanism (all three parts verified, details below):
2:2.10-24+rpt1carries one patch,0020-dbus-Fix-reporting-of-the-SAE-KeyMgmt.patch(upstream 26c7f1bc, Debian #1147955). wpa_supplicant now listssaein its D-BusKeyMgmtcapabilities when the driver setsNL80211_FEATURE_SAE.- brcmfmac in
rpi-6.18.ysetsNL80211_FEATURE_SAEwhenBRCMF_FEAT_SAE_EXTis enabled (cfg80211.c,brcmf_setup_wiphy). The shipped/usr/lib/modprobe.d/rpi-brcmfmac.conf(feature_disable=0x282000, firmware-nonfree 348a967) clears FWSUP (bit 13), SAE (bit 19) and DUMP_OBSS (bit 21), but not SAE_EXT, which is bit 25 in the 6.18 driver'sBRCMF_FEAT_LIST. So the driver still advertises SAE:wpa_cli get_capability auth_algprintsOPEN SHARED LEAP SAEon the Zero 2 W. - NetworkManager 1.52.1 (trixie) appends
SAEtokey_mgmtfor everywpa-pskprofile in station mode as soon as the supplicant reports SAE, PMF and BIP (nm-supplicant-config.c). wpa_supplicant 2.10 prefers SAE over PSK when both are offered, the BCM43430/1 firmware (7.45.96.s1, 2023-06-14) does not complete the external-auth SAE handshake, and NetworkManager never falls back to WPA2. The upstream NetworkManager fix that makespmf=disableopt out in station mode (b00c6749, 2025-06-05) is only in NetworkManager 1.56+, so a trixie Pi has no configuration-level escape.
Before the upgrade, the old supplicant only reported sae from capa.key_mgmt, which brcmfmac never populates, so NetworkManager stayed on WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK and everything worked. This is the same failure shape as #4976 (closed), where the community workaround brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x82000 was the fix, and the Zero 2 W data point that was missing in #6130 / #7610.
Steps to reproduce the behaviour
- Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, Raspberry Pi OS trixie (Lite), kernel
6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8, NetworkManager1.52.1-1+rpt4, firmware-brcm802111:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1, connected via NetworkManager (key-mgmt=wpa-psk) to an AP in WPA2/WPA3 transition mode (Netgear Orbi here;nmcli dev wifi listshowsRSN-FLAGS pair_ccmp group_ccmp psk sae). apt-get upgradetowpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1.- The postinst restarts
wpa_supplicant.service; the station never re-associates. Reboot: same. - Roll back to Debian's
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24and hold it: NetworkManager logsConfig: added 'key_mgmt' value 'WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK'and the association completes within a second.
Control: a second Zero 2 W on the same SSID running bookworm (wpasupplicant 2:2.10-12+deb12u3, NetworkManager 1.42.4) associates with key_mgmt=WPA2-PSK, pmf=1.
Device (s)
Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W
System
Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W Rev 1.0
Debian GNU/Linux 13 (trixie), 6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8
brcmfmac: Firmware: BCM43430/1 wl0: Jun 14 2023 07:27:45 version 7.45.96.s1 (gf031a129) FWID 01-70bd2af7 es7
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1 (broken) / 2:2.10-24 (works)
network-manager 1.52.1-1+rpt4
firmware-brcm80211 1:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1, /usr/lib/modprobe.d/rpi-brcmfmac.conf = options brcmfmac roamoff=1 feature_disable=0x282000
Logs
Last journal lines before the link died (shipped to a peer via systemd-journal-upload, the box itself has volatile logs):
22:26:53 sudo: COMMAND=/usr/bin/bash /tmp/bootstrap/mcapp.sh --dev --tag v2.0.10-dev.1 (runs apt-get upgrade)
22:27:42 /usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant replaced (inode ctime), /var/lib/dpkg/info/wpasupplicant.list 22:27:43
22:27:47 systemd[1]: Stopping wpa_supplicant.service - WPA supplicant...
(nothing after this; NetworkManager's /var/lib/NetworkManager/timestamps kept the profile at 22:27:48 across the next two boots)
With the 2:2.10-24 binary, same boot config:
NetworkManager[535]: device (wlan0): state change: need-auth -> prepare
NetworkManager[535]: Config: added 'key_mgmt' value 'WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK'
wpa_supplicant[536]: wlan0: Associated with 5a:af:97:2e:2b:8b
wpa_supplicant[536]: wlan0: CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED - Connection to 5a:af:97:2e:2b:8b completed
Capabilities on the Zero 2 W (2:2.10-24, i.e. what the driver exposes):
$ sudo wpa_cli get_capability key_mgmt
NONE IEEE8021X WPA-EAP WPA-PSK WPA-EAP-SUITE-B OWE DPP FT-PSK FT-EAP
$ sudo wpa_cli get_capability auth_alg
OPEN SHARED LEAP SAE
The +rpt1 patch makes the second line leak into the first over D-Bus.
Additional context
Suggested fixes, any one of which breaks the chain:
- firmware-nonfree: extend
rpi-brcmfmac.confto also clearSAE_EXT, i.e.feature_disable=0x2282000on 6.18 kernels, at least for the 43430 family. Note the mask is a raw bit index intoBRCMF_FEAT_LISTand shifts when the enum grows;SAE_EXTdid not exist when 0x282000 was chosen. - kernel: do not set
NL80211_FEATURE_SAEfor chips/firmware where external SAE authentication is known not to work (43430/1 with 7.45.96.s1). - wpa packaging: hold the D-Bus SAE-reporting patch back until the driver side no longer advertises SAE on those chips, or ship it together with the modprobe change.
- network-manager (trixie): backport b00c6749 so
wifi-sec.pmf=disableopts awpa-pskprofile out of SAE transition mode in station mode. That would at least give a configuration-level workaround.
Current workaround on the affected box: apt-mark hold wpasupplicant at 2:2.10-24, plus an apt pin. Alternatively brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000 on the kernel command line, per #4976, which I have not tested on this box.
Related: #4976 (identical symptom, Zero 2 W, closed with the feature_disable workaround), #6130, #7610 (SAE capability discussion, 2026-09-10, where a Zero 2 W data point was missing), #7528 (the issue the Debian bug references).
Activity
[fix] Bootstrap: never upgrade network-critical packages inline, pin …
Vandroiy78 commentedon Sep 19, 2026
I can reproduce this on my Raspberry Pi 4 2GB running Debian 13 'moode'.
Linux moode 6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8 #1 SMP PREEMPT Debian 1:6.18.50-1+rpt1 (2026-09-11) aarch64 GNU/Linux
After downgrading:
$ journalctl -b -u NetworkManager | grep key_mgmt
Sep 19 07:57:35 moode NetworkManager[577]: [1789797455.3377] Config: added 'key_mgmt' value 'WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK'
1p0d commentedon Sep 19, 2026
Also affected: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (BCM4345/6, i.e. CYW43455) on an AVM FRITZ!Box in WPA2/WPA3 mode (
RSN-FLAGS pair_ccmp group_ccmp psk sae).6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8, NetworkManager1.52.1-1+rpt4, firmware-brcm802111:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1brcmfmac: Firmware: BCM4345/6 wl0: Aug 29 2023 01:47:08 version 7.45.265 (28bca26 CY) FWID 01-b677b91bThe failure looked the same as in the report. unattended-upgrades installed
2:2.10-24+rpt1at 06:37:29, and NetworkManager'stimestampsfile last recorded the profile as active at 06:37:32. It never reassociated, and reboots didn't help.I reproduced the failure deliberately by reloading brcmfmac with the shipped
feature_disable=0x282000and running wpa_supplicant with-d. On this box the firmware is not what fails. The SAE handshake never starts, because wpa_supplicant has no password:This repeats every ~12.6 s, alternating between the 5 GHz and 2.4 GHz BSS, and never falls back to PSK.
The profile was provisioned by Raspberry Pi Imager, which stores the Wi-Fi credential as the 64-hex-digit PSK (the PBKDF2 output) rather than the passphrase.
network-configon the boot partition, the netplan YAML and NetworkManager's802-11-wireless-security.pskall hold 64 hex characters. WPA2-PSK can use that key directly; SAE needs the passphrase. NetworkManager 1.52.1 still appendsSAE FT-SAE, and wpa_supplicant then picks SAE, which can never succeed.With the actual passphrase, SAE works on the 43455. I tested with the same driver config, so SAE was advertised, using in-memory NetworkManager profiles:
key-mgmt=sae,pmf=required: connects,key_mgmt=SAE,sae_group=19key-mgmt=wpa-pskwith the passphrase (NetworkManager appends SAE as above): connects,key_mgmt=SAEThe
wpa-pskcase:So the chain here is: the driver advertises SAE, NetworkManager adds SAE to a
wpa-pskprofile, and that profile only holds a raw PSK. Any Imager-provisioned Pi whose driver advertises SAE should hit this on a transition-mode AP, whatever the chip.For the Zero 2 W it may be worth checking whether the profile also holds a 64-hex PSK (
sudo nmcli -s -g 802-11-wireless-security.psk connection show <profile> | tr -d '\n' | wc -cprints 64) and whether a failing attempt logsSAE: No password available. If so, the 43430 firmware may be fine too.That suggests one more place to break the chain: NetworkManager, or wpa_supplicant's key-management selection, could leave SAE out when the profile holds only a raw 64-hex PSK, since SAE can never succeed with one. I haven't checked whether newer NetworkManager or hostap releases already do this.
Workaround in use here, keeping
2:2.10-24+rpt1: a same-named/etc/modprobe.d/rpi-brcmfmac.confthat shadows the/usr/lib/modprobe.dcopy. The kernel command line stays untouched, and brcmfmac isn't in the initramfs underMODULES=dep, so noupdate-initramfsis needed:With it,
auth_algreportsOPEN SHARED LEAP, NetworkManager configureskey_mgmt 'WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK', and the connection comes up askey_mgmt=WPA2-PSK. Bit 25 =SAE_EXTmatchesBRCMF_FEAT_LISTinrpi-6.18.y'sfeature.h. Alternatively, at least on the 43455, storing the passphrase instead of the hash makes WPA3 work without touching the driver.ValdikSS commentedon Sep 19, 2026
Well, we have many bugs in different places here.
(not a bug of rpi, just for info) wpa_cli reports different information over its cli interface and dbus interface, which is used by NetworkManager. This is a known issue. In this case, wpa_cli reports SAE in auth_alg, but dbus interface in KeyMtmg. Just make sure to 'read it properly'. And the key_mgmt is filled from the template, not a real data from the fw.
This patch in wpa_supplicant has just fixed what NetworkManager expects to see for SAE, that's all. If the firmware is broken for some reason, Raspberry Pi should use the firmware that does not expose SAE support. Or better, fix the firmware.
In NetworkManager configuration file,
key-mgmt=wpa-pskmeansWPA2 & WPA3 Personal, andkey-mgmt=saemeansWPA3-Personal Only. I don't see any way to force WPA2 only. Disabling PMF, if it were available in Trixie version, is not a good solution either (you'd rather use it with WPA2).See https://networkmanager.dev/docs/api/latest/settings-802-11-wireless-security.html
Could you debug why SAE does not work on 2W instead? You'd need to run wpa_supplicant with
debug_level debug, not sure how to do that from NetworkManager from the start, but runningwpa_cli log_level debugand then trying to connect to the network should do the trick, check journalctl.gkoch02 commentedon Sep 19, 2026
Another data point, plus confirmation of the
0x2282000workaround on the chip in the title.Confirmed on Zero 2 W / BCM43430/1 with
2:2.10-24+rpt1still installedSame failure shape as the report: Wi-Fi died the moment
apt-get upgraderestartedwpa_supplicant.service, and never returned across reboots.6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8, NetworkManager1.52.1brcmfmac: Firmware: BCM43430/1 wl0: Jun 14 2023 07:27:45 version 7.45.96.s1 (gf031a129) FWID 01-70bd2af7 es7psk sae(NM's AP dump showsR:0588, i.e.PAIR_CCMP|GROUP_CCMP|KEY_MGMT_PSK|KEY_MGMT_SAE)Failing, with the stock
feature_disable=0x282000and+rpt1:1024=WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE. This repeated indefinitely at ~10 s per attempt. Noteieee80211w=0: setting NM'spmf=1on the profile did not stop NM appendingSAE FT-SAE, consistent with the 1.56+ note in the report.After adding SAE_EXT to the mask (
brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000; I used the kernel command line, the/etc/modprobe.dshadow works equally), with2:2.10-24+rpt1still installed:Associates in about a second, stable since. I deliberately reinstalled
+rpt1after applying the mask, with no pin or downgrade in place, to confirm the mask alone is sufficient on this chip.The mask value is kernel-specific —
0x2282000is wrong on 6.12BRCMF_FEAT_LISTwas reordered between kernels. Fromfeature.h:rpi-6.12.ySAE_EXTPMKID_V3rpi-6.18.ySCAN_V2SAE_EXTSo on bookworm/6.12 the equivalent is
0x682000; copying0x2282000there disablesPMKID_V3and leaves SAE_EXT enabled. Conversely a 6.12-derived0x682000becomes wrong after a trixie upgrade, where bit 22 isSCAN_V2. Worth flagging, since anyone pre-empting this on bookworm (or following #4976's older0x82000) will copy a literal. For a kernel-independent guard on boxes I did not want to touch the driver on, I pinned the origin for this package instead:Re @1p0d's question about the 43430 and
SAE: No password availablePartial answer only. The profile here is Imager-provisioned and does hold the 64-hex PSK rather than a passphrase (both the netplan YAML and NM's
802-11-wireless-security.pskare 64 hex characters), so the same precondition applies. But at default supplicant verbosity the 43430 loggedAuthentication with <bssid> timed out— a 10 s auth timeout — rather thanSAE: No password available/SAE: Failed to build SAE commitand an immediateExternal auth status: 1. I did not run with-dbefore applying the fix, so I cannot say whether the 43430 also fails at the "no password" stage or genuinely stalls in external auth. Happy to reproduce with-dif that data point would help settle whether the 43430 firmware is implicated at all.Minor, but it made this much harder to diagnose
Pi OS ships
/usr/lib/systemd/journald.conf.d/40-rpi-volatile-storage.confwithStorage=volatile, and a drop-in overridesjournald.conf. On a headless Wi-Fi-only box this failure therefore leaves no logs at all to read afterwards — the box boots fine, sshd starts, and nothing is recorded. An/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/drop-in withStorage=persistentis needed before the failure to capture anything. Might be worth a line in any eventual workaround note.429pm commentedon Sep 20, 2026
Have just worked through a similar problem but on a Pi4.
Hardware: Raspberry Pi 4
OS: Raspberry Pi OS Trixie, 64-bit
Network: NetworkManager + Netplan
AP: TP-Link Archer C80
Band: 2.4 GHz, channel 11 / 2462 MHz
SSID: AnS.HQ
Fresh Trixie installation initially had:
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24
With the Archer configured as WPA3-Personal + WPA2-PSK[AES], the first apt upgrade reached:
Setting up wpasupplicant (2:2.10-24+rpt1) ... and the Pi disappeared from the network.
Reflashed the card and upgraded all packages except wpasupplicant. The Pi remained connected.
Installed 2:2.10-24+rpt1 manually while the Archer was configured WPA2-PSK[AES] only. Upgrade completed successfully; approximately 14 pings from independent window were lost during the supplicant restart, then connectivity recovered.
Rebooted successfully with 2:2.10-24+rpt1 and WPA2.
Changed the Archer back to WPA3-Personal + WPA2-PSK[AES]. Connectivity immediately failed.
Changed the Archer back to WPA2-PSK[AES]. After several connection attempts, connectivity recovered.
Note: nmcli -f active,ssid,security dev wifi reports AnS.HQ as WPA2 when in the WPA2-only configuration.
I also have two Zero 2 Ws that have now started responding again since the C80 router has been switched to WPA2-PSK[AES]. They were also absent from AnS.HQ after the upgrade to wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1.
ValdikSS commentedon Sep 20, 2026
pelwell commentedon Sep 20, 2026
That's a very different issue. 43436P, 43436S and 43456 are all Synaptics parts, and the Synaptics firmware handles SAE offload differently. There's a ticket open with them about SAE on 43456, and hopefully if we get that working we might be able to backport those changes to other parts, but I don't think it will be possible without new firmwares.
ValdikSS commentedon Sep 20, 2026
Well, my favor to ask applies to Rpi4 as well, which has 43455. It should be working, right?
Knubbel commentedon Sep 20, 2026
Data point: Raspberry Pi 4B (BCM4345/6) — same regression, headless WLAN-only box, recovery required physical access + SD image restore
I have seen a Pi 4B mentioned further down in this thread — here is the detailed evidence from our affected Pi 4B box. Same package, same mechanism, different chip family than the Zero 2 W report above.
System
Note the modprobe mask is identical to the Zero 2 W report (
0x282000) — the shipped Pi OS image uses the same mask for the 4345/6 family, and it has the same gap:SAE_EXT(bit 25) is not cleared.Impact on this box (why this is worse than a transient disconnect)
This Pi is a headless home-automation + energy-management server (ioBroker; it feeds live meter data to a battery-storage system) and it is deployed WLAN-only — no ethernet at the installation site, no fallback console.
When the upgrade restarted
wpa_supplicant.service, the link dropped and never came back. SSH gone, device gone from the network, reboot did not help. Recovery sequence we had to go through:data was only recoverable afterwards (and partially) via a separate app-internal
backup; the last hours before the outage are permanently gone.
So an unattended
apt upgradeescalated into an on-site intervention with data loss — because of this package regression.Timeline
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1published on archive.raspberrypi.com (trixie).systemd-run, LAN attached for access) — failure reproduced exactly, with full logging. Evidence below is from this reproduction.Evidence
NetworkManager key_mgmt before/after the single package change (same boot config, same AP):
The
external_auth failed: status=1errors then repeat on every re-association attempt (dozens within minutes), with the SSID being temp-disabled in a loop. Permanent, survives reboot — identical to the Zero 2 W description.Driver-level capability mismatch on this Pi 4B box (BCM4345/6, firmware 7.45.265, currently on Debian 2:2.10-24 — this is what the driver exposes, independent of the supplicant version):
Exactly the same shape as reported for the Zero 2 W:
auth_algadvertises SAE,key_mgmtdoes not — and the+rpt1D-Bus patch makes the second line leak into NetworkManager's key_mgmt calculation. So the mechanism is not limited to the 43430/1 family; the 4345/6 on Pi 4B is affected the same way, with the same shippedfeature_disable=0x282000mask that missesSAE_EXT.pmf=disabledoes NOT provide an escape on trixie — confirmedBefore downgrading, we tried the configuration-level workaround on the NetworkManager profile:
This confirms the analysis in the issue: the upstream NM fix (b00c6749) that makes
pmf=disableopt out of SAE in station mode is not in trixie's NetworkManager 1.52.1. On a trixie Pi there is currently no configuration-level opt-out — package rollback or a kernel/firmware-side change are the only levers.Workaround in production (verified)
key_mgmtwithout SAE again; association completes within ~1 second.2:2.10-24+ same AP → connects fine (because without the D-Bus patch NM never learns the driver would do SAE).2:2.10-24and the RPT rebuild+rpt1carry the same CVE state; the delta in+rpt1is only the SAE D-Bus reporting patch (upstream 26c7f1bc / Debian #1147955), so the hold does not fall behind on security fixes.brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000on the kernel command line — downgrade + hold was sufficient for us. (If the mask approach is chosen as the real fix: the same0x282000is shipped on Pi 4 images, so the corrected mask needs to go out for the 4345/6 family as well, not only 43430/1.)Suggested-fix scope
With respect to the suggestions in the opening post: our data point extends the affected set from "43430/1 with 7.45.96.s1" to 4345/6 with 7.45.265 (Pi 4B) — same failure, same missing
SAE_EXTbit in the shipped mask. A chip-allowlist approach in the kernel would need to cover both families; a correctedrpi-brcmfmac.confmask would fix both in one place. From an operator's perspective, shipping the modprobe change together with (or before) any wpa packaging change that enables SAE reporting would prevent this class of stranding — for headless WLAN-only devices this package update is a brick-level event, not a brief blip.pwnsen commentedon Sep 21, 2026
Same problem here – sharing in case it helps. The workaround from this issue works on my Zero 2 W.
brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000on the kernel command line (marked as untested in the original report) fixes it here, with2:2.10-24+rpt1still installed.Setup
6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v7BCM43430/1 wl0: Jun 14 2023 07:27:45 version 7.45.96.s1 (gf031a129) FWID 01-70bd2af7 es71.52.1-1+rpt4, firmware-brcm802111:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1,/usr/lib/modprobe.d/rpi-brcmfmac.conf=options brcmfmac roamoff=1 feature_disable=0x282000key-management: pskwith the 64-hex PSK the Imager writesFailure:
apt full-upgradeon 2026-09-20 pulledwpasupplicant 2:2.10-24 -> 2:2.10-24+rpt1. The link dropped in the very second the postinst restarted the service (/var/lib/NetworkManager/timestampsfrozen at that second,/etc/resolv.confemptied by NM in the same second) and did not come back across 4 reboots.Fix: appended
brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000to/boot/firmware/cmdline.txt(edited on another machine, the box was unreachable). Nothing else changed.After reboot:
Compare with the original report: there
get_capability auth_algprintsOPEN SHARED LEAP SAE. With bit 25 masked,SAEis gone and NetworkManager no longer appendsSAEtokey_mgmt.Two additional data points:
extsaein their feature string (brcmfmac43436s-sdio.bin7.45.96.s1 andbrcmfmac43436-sdio.bin9.88.4.77), so both board variants should be affected.SAEtokey_mgmtregardless of the PSK format, but SAE cannot be performed without the passphrase. If that reading is right, a firmware fix alone would not be sufficient on such systems.Note for anyone recovering a headless box:
systemd.run=on the kernel command line had no effect on the Pi OS image here, because/etc/systemd/system/default.targettakes precedence over the generator'sdefault.targetsymlink. Editingcmdline.txton the FAT partition from another computer was the quickest recovery.mrman486 commentedon Sep 21, 2026
Same issues with Pi3
Changed the router settings as above removing the WPA3 and the Pi3 connects again. No other changes were made to the Pi3 just the update over the weekend of wpasupplicant
I went into nmtui and checked what the password was and it was different to what it should be. I cleared it, saved the correct one, rebooted and now WPA3 is working along with WPA2.
My build was from the imager_2.0.11.1 Rasp Pi OS lite x64
rpi-brcmfmac.conf: also disable SAE_EXT (bit 25)
Omer8990 commentedon Sep 21, 2026
Same bug on two boards that are not Zero 2 W. Both BCM4345/6 (43455), fw 7.45.265, kernel 6.18.50+rpt, fresh Trixie images from today, WPA2/WPA3 mixed AP, NetworkManager 1.52.1.
Pi 4 (4GB): Wi-Fi dropped during
apt full-upgradeat the exact second dpkg.log shows wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt1 being configured (13:31:51), never came back, also not after reboot.Pi 5 (8GB): identical symptom, I reflashed before understanding it.
With the new supplicant left installed, adding
brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000to cmdline.txt fixes it:wpa_cli get_capability key_mgmtno longer lists SAE, NM associates WPA2-PSK, stable since. Checked the bits against rpi-6.18.y feature.h: 13=FWSUP, 19=SAE, 21=DUMP_OBSS, 25=SAE_EXT, so the shipped 0x282000 predates SAE_EXT.PR with the one-line change to debian/rpi-brcmfmac.conf: RPi-Distro/firmware-nonfree#61
oxivanisher commentedon Sep 21, 2026
I don't know if this helps in any way, and I did not debug it further, but on one Pi5 (no dektop env.) the update went trough without any problems on another Pi5 (with a desktop env) I had to downgrade wpasupplicant to get online again.
36 remaining items
jmozmoz commentedon Oct 2, 2026
I am not really sure what I am talking about here, but: The mask should be 0x2282000, not 0x82000. So you have to add another 2 to the beginning of the one which is used by default (0x282000)
Linus-007 commentedon Oct 2, 2026
Follow-up: I retested using the corrected mask brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000.
I confirmed after reboot that the running kernel had:
brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000
active in /proc/cmdline.
Wi-Fi was working normally with wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24.
I then upgraded only:
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24 -> 2:2.10-24+rpt3
The Wi-Fi connection failed immediately during package installation, before any reboot.
So on this Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, the corrected 0x2282000 workaround does not prevent the regression with 2:2.10-24+rpt3.
jmozmoz commentedon Oct 2, 2026
Have you tried to reboot after upgrading wpasupplicant? I observed the same behaviour: The connection fails during the package installation. But after a reboot, the connection to WiFi worked.
jmozmoz commentedon Oct 4, 2026
Update, the router lost the connection to the Pi Zero 2 W. In the log of the routher (Fritzbox) the following can be found:
Translated: Wi-Fi authentication failed: Re-authentication failed due to active "Protected Management Frames (PMF)" support. MAC address: 2C:CF:XX:XX:XX:XX.
Update: I explicitly added
pmf=2to[wifi-security]in the NetworkManger config. Let's see if this helps.jmozmoz commentedon Oct 6, 2026
All this didn't help. Now I am back to wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24 and removed all settings for modprobe/pmf. Let's see, if this fixes the problem, the connection doesn't fail sometime due to pmf. At least connecting to Wifi with WPA2+WPA3 enabled in the FritzBox works.
carhensi commentedon Oct 10, 2026
I have the same issue. Reproducible on wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt3 (Zero 2 W, BCM43430/1, kernel 6.18.50, NM 1.52.1). UniFi WPA2/WPA3 mixed mode. Verified the profile stores a real passphrase, not a 64-hex PSK.
pmf=1alone didn't help: auth timeouts, SAE still in NM's key_mgmt. Addingbrcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000and rebooting got it connected via WPA2. Same supplicant version.. I'd be happy to test the proper fix.carhensi commentedon Oct 10, 2026
Still reproducible on wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt3 — and notably with a real passphrase, not a derived 64-hex PSK, so the +rpt3 derived-key fix doesn't cover this path.
iw scan→Authentication suites: PSK SAE)key-mgmt=wpa-pskwith a passphrasepmf=1/ieee80211w=0on the profile does not help. Only disabling SAE_EXT (bit 25) does —brcmfmac.feature_disable=0x2282000→CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED+ DHCP immediately. Happy to run further diagnostics or test the proper fix on this hardware.Linus-007 commentedon Oct 13, 2026
I reviewed the relevant
brcmfmacsource path and the Raspberry Pi packaging around this issue. I think there is a concrete flaw worth testing rather than continuing to treat this only as awpa_supplicantregression.The Raspberry Pi configuration currently relies on a hard-coded
brcmfmacfeature bitmap:That bitmap is tied to the bit positions generated by
BRCMF_FEAT_LIST. Those positions have changed between kernel versions. In the current 6.18 tree,SAE_EXTis bit 25, so the existing mask does not disable it.The result is effectively:
brcmfmactherefore still reports external SAE capability upwards. Once the Raspberry Piwpa_supplicantbuild started exposing SAE capability correctly over D-Bus, NetworkManager could legitimately select SAE on a WPA2/WPA3 transition network.That makes the hard-coded bitmap fairly fragile. Its meaning changes when the feature enumeration changes, without the configuration file itself changing.
There also appears to be a possible place for a more durable fix in
brcmfmac. The driver already has firmware-feature override infrastructure infeature.c, but it appears to trust the firmwaresae_extcapability sufficiently to expose SAE without a BCM43430/1 firmware-specific exclusion.For the affected Zero 2 W firmware, I think it is worth considering whether
BRCMF_FEAT_SAE_EXTshould be suppressed by a proper chip/firmware quirk rather than by another global numericfeature_disablemask.That would avoid depending on enum bit positions and would prevent user space from being told that SAE external authentication is usable on hardware/firmware where it is not reliable.
For reference, I also retested the corrected workaround:
I confirmed that exact value was active in
/proc/cmdline.With Debian:
Wi-Fi worked normally.
I then upgraded only:
and Wi-Fi failed immediately during package installation, before reboot.
So on this Zero 2 W, even explicitly disabling
SAE_EXTwith the corrected 6.18 mask does not make+rpt3reliable.I do not think that proves the kernel capability advertisement is the only problem, but it does suggest two things may be present here:
brcmfmacfeature-disable mechanism that allowedSAE_EXTto remain exposed after the enum changed.+rpt3even when the corrected mask is active.It may be worth testing a proper
brcmfmacfirmware/chip-specificSAE_EXTquirk instead of relying on the raw bitmap, then seeing whether the remaining+rpt3failure persists.Linus-007 commentedon Oct 13, 2026
I looked deeper, and there is an important correction to our earlier conclusion.
The most likely fix is still to disable
SAE_EXTon the affected BCM43430/1 firmware, but our test did not actually prove that the corrected mask was effective. We only checked/proc/cmdline. That proves the parameter was present on the kernel command line; it does not prove whatbrcmfmacultimately loaded as its effectivefeature_disablevalue, nor whether SAE was actually no longer advertised.The issue contains two strong data points on the same Zero 2 W / BCM43430/1 / 6.18 /
+rpt3combination:jmozmozchanged the effective module configuration tofeature_disable=0x2282000, rebooted, and SAE support becamenone advertised; WPA2 connection then worked.carhensireproduced the failure with a real plaintext passphrase and+rpt3;pmf=1did nothing, butfeature_disable=0x2282000plus reboot immediately restored the connection using the same+rpt3supplicant.That is much stronger evidence than I initially gave it credit for.
The source confirms why.
brcmfmacreads the firmware capability string, seessae_ext, setsBRCMF_FEAT_SAE_EXT, and later appliessettings->feature_disableby clearing those feature bits.If
SAE_EXTsurvives,brcmfmacadvertises SAE upwards and NetworkManager 1.52.1 can add SAE to a WPA2/WPA3 transition-mode profile.The actual defect is therefore this:
On 6.18 the shipped mask is:
but
SAE_EXTis now bit 25, so the effective mask required to disable it becomes:This demonstrates why a raw numeric bitmap is a fragile long-term mechanism: the meaning of the mask changes when the enum changes.
Proposed source-level fix
I believe this should be fixed in
brcmfmac, not inwpa_supplicant.For the affected firmware:
the driver should clear
BRCMF_FEAT_SAE_EXTby feature name after firmware capability detection, rather than relying on Raspberry Pi OS to maintain a kernel-version-dependent numeric bitmap.Conceptually:
The existing
brcmfmacsource already contains chip-specific feature corrections after capability probing, so this would be consistent with the existing design.A cleaner implementation would be to extend the firmware override table so that it can explicitly disable features as well as enable them.
For example:
with an entry such as:
and then:
That would be kernel-version independent because it uses:
rather than a literal numeric mask such as:
If the enum moves again, the compiler calculates the correct bit automatically.
Important correction to my own earlier test
I previously reported that:
did not prevent the regression with
wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt3.That conclusion was too strong.
Before installing
+rpt3, I confirmed only that:appeared in
/proc/cmdline.I did not verify the effective loaded module parameter or confirm that SAE had actually disappeared from the driver's advertised capabilities.
The checks that should have been captured were:
The decisive state would be an effective
feature_disablevalue corresponding to0x2282000and no SAE capability being advertised.Because that was not verified, my earlier statement that the corrected mask itself failed is not conclusive.
Based on the other controlled tests in this issue, the strongest supported fix is therefore:
Blacklist
BRCMF_FEAT_SAE_EXTfor the affected BCM43430/1 firmware insidebrcmfmac, rather than relying on a rawfeature_disablenumeric bitmap.That appears to address the underlying capability-advertisement defect while avoiding a kernel-version-dependent configuration workaround.
Fix Wi-Fi on WPA2/WPA3 networks on 6.18 kernels
wesleygas commentedon Oct 31, 2026
I can confirm this issue is still actively reproducible on a freshly flashed Pi Zero 2 W running Debian 13 (Trixie) with the latest packages.
Looked at the handshake failure and wanted to share my findings and test results in case it helps
Environment
brcmfmac43430-sdio.binFWID01-70bd2af7 es7)6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8 #1 SMP PREEMPT Debian 1:6.18.50-1+rpt1 (2026-09-11) aarch64wpasupplicant:2:2.10-24+rpt3network-manager:1.52.1-1+rpt4firmware-brcm80211:1:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1Observed Behavior & Handshake Trace
Connecting via
nmcli dev wifi connect <SSID>fails after ~3 seconds with:NetworkManager injects SAE FT-SAE into key_mgmt:
Config: added 'key_mgmt' value 'WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK SAE FT-SAE'
wpa_supplicant attempts Auth Type 4 (SAE) via nl80211:
nl802111: sae_pwe=2
nl80211: Connect request send successfully
wlan0: Trying to associate with (SSID='...' freq=2462 MHz)
wlan0: Authentication with timed out.
When testing a standalone wpa_supplicant config against the identical transitional AP forcing pure key_mgmt=WPA-PSK:
wlan0: State: ASSOCIATING -> ASSOCIATED
wlan0: WPA: Key negotiation completed with [PTK=CCMP GTK=CCMP]
wlan0: State: GROUP_HANDSHAKE -> COMPLETED
wlan0: Radio work 'connect' done in 0.162845 seconds
The password, radio, and WPA2 4-way handshake succeed in 0.16s. The failure is isolated entirely to the SAE external-auth exchange on this chip.
──────
Still Open:
The shipped /lib/modprobe.d/rpi-brcmfmac.conf in firmware-brcm80211 (1:20260519-1~bpo13+1+rpt1) still defines:
options brcmfmac roamoff=1 feature_disable=0x282000
Inspecting the kernel module feature table for 6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8:
• Bit 18 (0x40000): SAE
• Bit 24 (0x1000000 / 25th bit 1-indexed): SAE_EXT
Neither is covered by 0x282000. Masking 0x1000000 successfully clears the Device supports SAE with AUTHENTICATE command flag from iw phy0 info.
Even with the driver feature masked, wpa_supplicant (2:2.10-24+rpt3) continues to unconditionally advertise "sae" in its D-Bus KeyMgmt interface capabilities due to a static compile-time declaration
(CONFIG_SAE=y) rather than gating on driver capabilities.
Because NetworkManager detects "sae" on the D-Bus interface, its supplicant generator in nm-supplicant-config.c forcibly expands wpa-psk profiles to include SAE FT-SAE. Neither proto rsn nor pmf 1 in NM
prevents this expansion.
• When we suppressed the "sae" string match in NM, NM passed WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 FT-PSK, and the interface associated and acquired DHCP immediately.
aidanxcan commentedon Nov 7, 2026
I hit what looks like the same symptom on a Pi 4 (SAE completes, then
status_code=16), but on Bookworm, and in my case neither the feature mask nor the stored PSK was involved. I found the cause and a workaround that keeps WPA3, so I'm posting it here in case it explains some of the 43455 reports.Setup:
01-b677b91b)6.12.109+rpt-rpi-v8, wpa_supplicant 2.10, NetworkManager 1.42.4key-mgmt=saewith the plaintext passphrasef4 01 20)Every join failed right after a successful SAE exchange. With the supplicant at debug level, commit and confirm both completed with status 0 ("SAE completed - setting PMK"), and then:
That 16 doesn't come from the AP. brcmfmac reports every failed connect as status 16 (
brcmf_bss_connect_donesetsWLAN_STATUS_AUTH_TIMEOUT). I added logging to the driver's event handlers to see what the chip itself got back:E_AUTH status 0, thenE_ASSOC status 1 reason 1. On an association failure that reason is the AP's 802.11 status code, so the AP was answering 1, "unspecified failure". Switching to firmware 7.45.286, or zeroing the PMKID in the driver (more on that below), didn't change it.hostapd only answers status 1 after SAE in one place, the downgrade check in
check_assoc_ies(). When the AP runssae_pwe=2, it refuses a station whose RSNXE claims SAE-H2E if the SAE exchange used hunting-and-pecking. That's what the Pi ends up doing here, for three reasons:SaePweD-Bus property. NetworkManager 1.42 tries to setSaePwe=2(nm-supplicant-interface.c), the set fails, andsae_pwestays at 0, so SAE always uses hunting-and-pecking. It can't have been 2: with 2 the supplicant would have picked H2E, because the AP's scan entry carried the H2E flag (thesae_pwe=1test below only works if it does).brcmf_parse_vndr_ies), so the firmware builds the association request, and it seems to put an H2E-capable RSNXE in it no matter which method the host used. I didn't capture the frame over the air, so this part is inferred from the AP's answer and from the fix.Forcing
sae_pwe=1(H2E only) on the running supplicant got it on the first try:The chip reported
E_ASSOC status 0and the 4-way handshake completed. To make it stick across reboots under NetworkManager, I create the wlan0 supplicant interface from a config file before NetworkManager starts. NetworkManager adopts the interface that's already there:That runs from a oneshot unit ordered
Before=NetworkManager.service, and a device I have in production on this network now joins at boot that way.sae_pwe=2should work too, since the supplicant then uses H2E whenever the AP advertises it, but I haven't tested that.wesleygas's trace above shows
sae_pwe=2reaching nl80211 on Trixie, so Trixie may not have the first gap and this might only affect Bookworm. Someone with a WPA3-only AP that does H2E and a Trixie Pi could settle that.One more thing I noticed in the driver while I was in there: in rpi-6.12.y,
brcmf_cfg80211_external_auth()buildsstruct brcmf_auth_req_status_leon the stack without zeroing it and never fillspmkid, so the firmware gets stack contents as the PMKID. Mainline'sbrcmf_cyw_external_auth()zeroes the struct and copiesparams->pmkid. Fixing it didn't change the result for me, but it should probably be fixed anyway.Feel free to reach out to me here.
Aidan Cannon (@aidanxcan)
docs: record the household SSID downgrade to WPA2-only, 2.4+5 GHz
pelwell commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Pull request #7762 adds three commits which together should allow both Zero 2 variants to connect to WPA3 APs. It should not need the brcmfmac feature_disable flags, but they should be harmless.
You can install a trial build by running
sudo rpi-update pulls/7762, but read the caveats first.N.B. This is intended to be run with wpasupplicant 2:2.10-24+rpt3, but install the trial kernel before updating wpasupplicant if you aren't running
+rpt3already.