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Security: alecto-security/evidence-bundle

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report vulnerabilities through GitHub's private security advisories: open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability.

Do not open a public issue for a security report.

We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and will coordinate disclosure with you before any public advisory.

Scope

The verifier reads bundles it may not have produced, and external parties rely on the spec. Bugs that matter most to us:

  • Verification bypass: a tampered payload, stray file, missing proof file, forged sidecar or reshuffled manifest that passes verify.
  • Path handling: a manifest or metadata path that escapes the bundle (.., absolute paths, backslashes, duplicate entries) without rejection.
  • Symlink traversal: a link inside a bundle that this tool follows instead of rejecting.
  • Parser safety: a panic, hang, stack overflow or unbounded allocation on a hostile manifest or metadata.json.
  • Side effects: any write to the bundle, any network syscall at runtime, or any network-capable crate entering Cargo.lock (enforced by test).

Known limitations (not bugs)

  • Notary verification pins the key carried in the bundle. It does not establish that the key belongs to a recorder the reader trusts, and a slice cannot prove its first record's earlier link or detect tail truncation. See docs/SPEC.md §5.6.
  • disk_image provenance is checked for its sealed proof files; the forensic tool's output is not re-derived by this verifier.
  • Accepts schema v1 only (metadata.schema_version). Support for future schema versions must ship explicitly, never implicitly.

Supported versions

Security fixes land on main and release as patch versions of the current minor line.

There aren't any published security advisories